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RE-CONCEPTUALIZING THE NOTION
OF “EMPLOYER”: THE CASE OF LABOR
DISPATCH WORKERS IN CHINA
INTRODUCTION

I

n December, 2012, only four years after China’s enactment
of the Labor Contract Law (“LCL”),1 which was widely considered to be highly protective of workers’ rights,2 its legislature
passed an amendment3 modifying the provisions that governed
the use of labor dispatch workers and the regulation of the labor
dispatch industry. Labor dispatch is a triangular form of employment relationship among workers, a dispatch agency, and a host
company.4 Under such an arrangement, workers are hired by a
dispatch agency and sent to work for a third-party host company,
which in turn pays the agency a fee for the staffing service and
the workers’ labor.5 Because the dispatch agency, and not the
host company, is the formal employer of the dispatch workers,6
the host company can achieve significant cost savings, while
gaining the flexibility needed to quickly respond to shifts in market demand.7 According to the LCL, companies can “generally”

1. Laodong Hetong Fa (劳动合同法) [Labor Contract Law of the People’s
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
June 29, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008) (China) [hereinafter Labor Contract
Law].
2. Mary Gallagher et al., China’s 2008 Labor Contract Law: Implementation and Implications for China’s Workers 1 (The World Bank Working Paper
No.
6542,
2013),
available
at
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-6542.
3. Quanguo Renda Changweihui Guanyu Xiugai Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Laodong Hetong Fa de Jueding (全国人大常委会关于修改<<中华人
民共和国劳动合同法>>的决定) [Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Revising the Labor Contract Law of the People’s
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Dec. 28, 2012, effective July 1, 2013) (China) [hereinafter the Amendment].
4. Feng Xu, Labor Law Developments in China: The Emergence of Temporary Staffing Agencies in China, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 431, 431 (2009).
5. Id.
6. Labor Contract Law, supra note 1, art. 58.
7. Host companies are not directly responsible for the dispatch workers’
social security payment, compensation, and severance pay. Moreover, although
host companies indirectly pay dispatch workers compensation via the fee they
pay to the dispatch agency, the cost to the host company is less because dispatch workers are generally paid lower wages than direct hires. Michael
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use dispatch workers to fill “temporary, auxiliary, or substitute
jobs.”8 However, because the LCL tightened labor regulations by
requiring employers, among other things, to buy worker insurance, pay double wages for overtime, and pay severance depending on the employee’s years of service,9 many companies resorted
to the use of dispatch workers to avoid the costs of complying
with the restrictive new law.10
Contrary to a conventional, bilateral employment relationship
between an employee and a single employer, a dispatch worker
in a triangular labor dispatch arrangement may not be able to
identify who his employer is. This confusion stems from the nature of the labor dispatch arrangement and from the law itself.
Under a labor dispatch arrangement, the functions traditionally
exercised by a single employer are distributed between the dispatch agency and the host company.11 While the dispatch agency
determines when and where to assign the worker and pays the
worker wages and benefits, the host company exercises day-today supervision and control over the worker.12 Therefore, a dispatch worker may perceive someone who remunerates him as
the employer, or he may perceive someone who manages and
controls him as the employer. The law provides no clear guidance in this respect. Although the LCL identifies the dispatch
agency as the formal employer of dispatch workers,13 it also ascribes responsibility to both the dispatch agency and the host
company when the dispatch worker suffers harm.14 The Amendment to the LCL, which became effective in 2013 and specifically
Standaert, Effect of Chinese ‘Labor Dispatch’ Rules Could Be Muted by Loopholes and Laxity, BLOOMBERG BNA (May 8, 2013). See also Virginia Harper Ho
& Qiaoyan Huang, The Recursivity of Reform: China’s Amended Labor Contract Law, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 973, 977 (2014).
8. Labor Contract Law, supra note 1, art. 66.
9. See discussion infra Part I.A.
10. Dexter Roberts, Why China’s Factories Are Turning to Temp Workers,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-03-08/why-chinas-factories-are-turning-to-temp-workers.
11. Pauline Thai, Unfair Dismissal Protection for Labor Hire Workers? Implementing the Doctrine of Joint Employment in Australia, 2012 AJLL LEXIS
16, at *3 (2012). This paper provides a good discussion on the problems of Australian labor hire arrangement at a conceptual and practical level, which is
applicable to China’s labor dispatch arrangement because the two arrangements are quite similar.
12. Id.
13. Labor Contract Law, supra note 1, art. 58.
14. Labor Contract Law, supra note 1, art. 92.
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addresses labor dispatch, further complicates the situation by
limiting the sharing of responsibility only to situations where
the worker’s harm is caused by the host company.15 This necessitates a judicial determination as to which entity caused harm
to the worker in each case.
Although the 2013 Amendment makes dramatic adjustments
to the permitted scope of labor dispatch use and the regulation
of the labor dispatch industry as a whole,16 it fails to resolve the
fundamental question of who a dispatch worker’s ultimate employer is. This failure makes private enforcement of the law by
the dispatch workers more difficult and unlikely because they
may not necessarily know which entity to pursue when their
rights are violated.17 Many dispatch agencies operate as “empty
shells” and may continue to do so after the passage of the 2013
Amendment.18 Therefore, it is crucial that a dispatch worker be
able to pursue a more financially resourceful host company that
exercises employer functions over him and enjoys the benefits of
his labor, but does not have a contractual relationship with him.
This can be achieved by incorporating the doctrine of the joint
employer, as used in the United States, into China’s law.
Part I of this Note examines the transformation of China’s labor system from one of guaranteed lifetime employment to one
based on private contracts and the development of labor legislation against the backdrop of China’s late twentieth-century economic reform. It also traces the history and development of the
labor dispatch industry. Part II compares the labor dispatch provisions in the 2008 LCL with the 2013 Amendment and addresses the inadequacies of the current law. Part III examines
the joint employer doctrine of the United States. Part IV advocates for the incorporation of the joint employer doctrine into
China’s law, in order to ensure meaningful relief for dispatch
workers whose rights are violated.

15.
16.
17.
II.C.
18.

The Amendment, supra note 3, provision 4.
See discussion infra Part II.B.
See Ho & Huang, supra note 7, at 1018; see also discussion infra Part
See discussion infra Part II.C.
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I. BACKGROUND
China’s economic success today can be attributed to the economic and social reform it instituted few decades ago.19 The introduction of market mechanisms fundamentally altered the
way labor was organized and utilized. This Part explores the labor system changes initiated by the Chinese government beginning in the late-1970s and the development of labor legislation
that these changes necessitated. It also discusses the various
stages of development of the labor dispatch industry in China.
A. Smashing the Iron Rice Bowl: The Transformation of
China’s Labor System and the Development of Labor Legislation
From the founding of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”)
in 1949 until economic reforms began in the late 1970s, China,
under the leadership of Chairman Mao Zedong, implemented a
Soviet-style command economic system. 20 Under this system,
the state essentially owned and controlled all agricultural and
industrial enterprises.21 It set production targets and prices and
allocated resources in accordance to an economic plan promulgated by the State Council every five years.22 The state received
all revenues from the enterprises and subsidized or absorbed
any losses.23 On the labor side, the State assigned workers to
work in state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”) and dictated all hiring
and firing decisions.24 Workers in these positions remained in
the same work unit or enterprise for most, if not all, of their
working lives.25 By pledging allegiance to the Communist Party,
the ruling political party of the PRC, these workers received
guaranteed housing, schooling, medical care, and welfare and

19. Yu-Kong Zhao, What Drives China’s Success?, FORBES OPINION (Oct. 2,
2014, 4:05 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/10/02/what-driveschinas-success/.
20. DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 483 (2d ed. 2010).
21. See id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Xu, supra note 4, at 437.
25. Andrew G. Walder, Organized Dependency and Cultures of Authority in
Chinese Industry, 43 J. ASIAN STUD. 51, 54 (1983).
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pension benefits from the state.26 This labor arrangement was
known as the “iron rice bowl” system.27 This labor system promoted egalitarianism and precluded social differentiation
among workers, thereby reducing the likelihood of labor disputes.28 It also made workers reliant on the state for their livelihoods and standards of living.29 This reliance helped strengthen
Party control and rendered workers highly deferential, unquestionably obedient, and extremely reluctant to raise claims to
their superiors directly.30 Consequently, Party ideologies and orders, not labor laws, were the main instrument of handling labor
disputes.31
Burdened with this significant social welfare role, the SOEs
were highly inefficient. The state was more concerned with constructing a “harmonious society” than with achieving profits, efficiency, and productivity.32 During that time period, China re-

26. Eli Friedman & Ching Kwan Lee, Remaking the World of Chinese Labour: A 30-Year Retrospective, 48 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 507, 509 (2010).
Typically, an SOE worker would live in a dormitory or housing provided by the SOE, work in the adjacent SOE factory or plant, send his
children to the nearby school operated by the SOE, shop at the nearby
markets owned by the SOE, visit the doctor at the nearby SOE hospital, watch movies at a theater operated the SOE, and receive pension
benefits supplied by the SOE upon retirement.
CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 20, at 484–85. As a result, a worker’s professional, personal, and family lives became inextricably linked together, and
they all revolved around his work unit. Id.
27. In China, rice has been a staple food for many years. The concept of an
unbreakable “iron rice bowl,” thus, symbolized the Communist Party’s commitment to provide cradle-to-the-grave security for its citizens. NEIL C. HUGHES,
CHINA’S ECONOMIC CHALLENGE: SMASHING THE IRON RICE BOWL 5 (2002).
28. Yunqiu Zhang, Labor Law Reforms: China’s Response to Challenges of
Globalization, in MODERN CHINESE LEGAL REFORM 131, 139 (Xiaobing Li & Qiang Fang eds., 2013).
29. Walder, supra note 25, at 55.
30. Id. at 53.
31. Zhang, supra note 28, at 139.
32. See Minqi Zhang, The Labor Contract Law: Construction of Harmonious
Labor Relations, 3 CHINA LEGAL DEV. Y.B. 131, 131–34 (2009); CHOW &
SCHOENBAUM, supra note 20, at 485.
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stricted foreign trade and barred most private and foreign enterprises. 33 Market competition was virtually absent. 34 SOEs
lacked the incentive to perform well. In the event that an SOE
performed poorly financially, the state would intervene to preserve the enterprise in order to avoid the significant social costs
that might otherwise result.35 SOE workers received a common
salary regardless of performance and were not discharged for
unsatisfactory work. 36 These economic and labor policies kept
China poor, backward, and stagnant.37
Following Mao’s death in 1976, China began to reconcile itself
to the country’s poverty and underdevelopment.38 In 1978, under
the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China began to experiment
with capitalism and the development of free markets.39 Deng announced an “open door” policy, which formally opened China to
foreign trade and investment. 40 Four special economic zones
(“SEZs”) were established along the coast for the purpose of attracting foreign capital and businesses. 41 These SEZs were
33. WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33534, CHINA’S
ECONOMIC RISE: HISTORY, TRENDS, CHALLENGES, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
UNITED STATES 2 (2014) [hereinafter CONG. RESEARCH SERV.].
34. Id.
35. CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 20, at 485.
36. Id.
37. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 33, at 2.
38. CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 20, at 485.
39. Reformer
with
an
Iron
Fist:
Deng
Xiaoping,
CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1999/china.50/inside.china/profiles/deng.xiao
ping (last visited Oct. 4, 2014).
40. Inside China’s Ruling Party: Open Door Policy, BBC NEWS,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/asia_pac/02/china_party_congress/china_ruling_party/key_people_events/html/open_door_policy.stm (last
visited Oct. 4, 2014).
41. The Chinese government balked at opening the entire economy all at
once and strategically designated four coastal cities (Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Xiamen, and Hainan) as SEZs to test the efficacy of free market economic principles. Douglas Zhihua Zeng, China’s Special Economic Zones and Industrial
Clusters: Success and Challenges, LET’S TALK DEV. (Apr. 27, 2011),
http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/china-s-special-economic-zonesand-industrial-clusters-success-and-challenges. Party leader, Deng Xiaoping,
aptly described this experimental approach as “crossing the river by feeling the
stones.” Meaning that, rather than proceeding aggressively, reforms were to
be undertaken incrementally. The state carefully evaluated the results of each
reform before designing the next stage. William Martin et al., Trade Policy,
Structural Change, and China’s Trade Growth, in HOW FAR ACROSS THE
RIVER?: CHINESE POLICY REFORM AT THE MILLENNIUM 153, 158 (Nicholas C.
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hugely successful, which led to the subsequent rollout of more
SEZs and industrial clusters throughout the country.42 Moreover, the state permitted the development of the private sector,
viewing it as complementary to the state sector.43 The burgeoning foreign and private enterprises created enormous competitive pressure for the SOEs, which were encumbered with the expensive “iron rice bowl” system.44 In response, the state relaxed
central planning and granted SOEs the right to make their own
managerial decisions, including investment and production, hiring and firing, and the setting of wages and prices.45 It also carried out restructuring of the SOEs and spun off certain nonessential state businesses to the private sector.46 The restructuring of the state sector caused massive layoffs47 and broke the social contract implicitly formed between the state and the workers, who had enjoyed job tenure and generous welfare benefits
in the planned economy.48 The resultant loss of job security and
disruption to workers’ families and social lives pressured the
state to enact labor legislation in order to deal with labor grievances and, more importantly, to sustain a social order conducive
to economic development.49
Hope et al. eds., 2000). Within the SEZs, foreign enterprises received preferential treatment compared to their local counterparts. For example, a foreign enterprise would enjoy guaranteed protection of private property rights, tax
breaks, duty-free imports of raw materials, and faster customs clearance, and
they were regulated by more liberal labor laws. See Douglas Zhihua Zeng, How
Do Special Economic Zones and Industrial Clusters Drive China’s Rapid Development? 16 (The World Bank Working Paper No. 5583, 2011), available at
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-5583
[hereinafter
Zeng, Working Paper] and Jin Wang, The Economic Impact of Special Economic Zones: Evidence from Chinese Municipalities, 101 J. DEV. ECON. 133, 137
(2013).
42. Zeng, Working Paper, supra note 41, at 12.
43. CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 20, at 485.
44. Friedman & Lee, supra note 26, at 509.
45. CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 20, at 485–87.
46. Xu, supra note 4, at 440.
47. Jill E. Monnin, Extending the Reach of the Chinese Labor Law: How Does
the Supreme People’s Court’s 2006 Interpretation Transform Labor Dispute
Resolution?, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 753, 756 (2007).
48. Friedman & Lee, supra note 26, at 507.
49. The need for economic development and legal reform was summarized
by Deng Xiaoping in the “Two-Hands” policy. On the one hand, the economy
must be developed; on the other hand, the legal system must be strengthened.
Jianfu Chen, Market Economy and the Internationalization of Civil and Commercial Law in the People’s Republic of China, in LAW, CAPITALISM AND POWER
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In 1980, the state began to experiment with labor contracts in
Shenzhen, one of the forerunner SEZs, in the context of joint
ventures as it was aware that foreigner investors might run into
difficulty hiring workers under the then existing socialist recruitment practice.50 It allowed joint ventures to stipulate terms
governing the employment, dismissal, and resignation of workers in labor contracts.51 The labor contract program was successful and was replicated in other coastal and regional areas. 52
Meanwhile, national and local authorities promulgated piecemeal legislation on the use of labor contracts in the form of laws,
regulations, notices, and directives, all of which created significant confusion.53 Eventually, in 1995, the Labor Law54 came into
effect and codified the labor contract system, consolidating and
superseding all previous laws.55
Although the 1995 Labor Law was regarded as a major legislative achievement, it provided only the “skeleton of a regulatory
framework” and could not effectively deal with the complexity of
labor problems that arose during the reform period.56 As part of
the efforts to liberalize the economy, China’s central government

IN ASIA 59, 59 (Kanishka Jayasuriya ed., 2006). See also Friedman & Lee, supra

note 26, at 509, 515.
50. Susan Leung, China’s Labor Contract System from Planned to Market
Economy, 3 J. L. ETHICS & INTELL. PROP. 1, 2–3 (2012). Labor contracts were
given statutory recognition by the Provisions for Labor Management in SinoForeign Joint Ventures of 1980. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 3
53. Zhang, supra note 28, at 140–43; see also Leung, supra note 50, at 3.
54. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Fa (中华人民共和国劳动法) [Labor Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 5, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995) (China);
Leung, supra note 50, at 3.
55. The 1995 Labor Law is the foundation for labor rights and regulations
in China. Aside from formally adopting a contract-based employment system
and regulating aspects like wages, working hours, and insurance, the 1995 Labor Law provided for labor dispute resolution. The resolution process brought
an important shift away from compromising forms of mediation toward more
adversarial arbitration and litigation, which was what the Chinese government intended. Monnin, supra note 47, at 754–55.
56. The 1995 Labor Law lacked specificities in many respects. Its articles
were either supplemented by numerous subordinate ordinances from various
state agencies or left unelaborated. Sean Cooney, Making Chinese Labor Law
Work: The Prospect for Regulatory Innovations in the People’s Republic of
China, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1050, 1055–56 (2007).
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granted local governments broad power to make economic decisions and allowed them to retain a significant portion of the revenue generated from trade and investment.57 Consequently, local governments vigorously competed with one another to nurture a pro-capital climate, which was attractive to investors, and
condoned relatively weak enforcement of labor laws, which in
turn guaranteed a ready supply of “cheap and docile” labor.58 In
addition, millions of rural migrant workers inundated urban areas for job opportunities, creating a “buyer’s market for labor.”59
Owing to the household registration—hukou—system, these
workers had a social status inferior to that of local resident
workers and so were particularly prone to exploitation and discrimination by employers. 60 They were subject to excessively
long working hours, lower wages, withholding of wages and benefits, termination without notice, non-renewal of employment
contracts, and unsafe working conditions.61 Labor protests and
unrest became widespread, putting pressure on the Chinese legislature to reform its labor law in order to restore social harmony
and stability.62
In 2007, China promulgated the Labor Contract Law63 to deal
with the defects of the 1995 Labor Law. The LCL contained nu-

57. Friedman & Lee, supra note 26, at 515.
58. Xu, supra note 4, at 435–36.
59. The number of rural migrant workers soared from an estimate of 30 million in 1989 to 130 million in 2006. Li Shi, Rural Migrant Workers in China:
Scenario, Challenges, and Public Policy 4–5 (Int’l Labor Office. Working Paper
No. 89, 2008). The abundance of migrant workers created a “buyer’s market
for labor.” MARVIN J. LEVINE, WORKER RIGHTS AND LABOR STANDARDS IN ASIA’S
FOUR NEW TIGERS: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 7 (1997).
60. See Huafeng Zhang, The Hukou System’s Constraints on Migrant Workers’ Job Mobility in Chinese Cities, 21 CHINA ECON. REV. 51 (2010).
61. Leung, supra note 50, at 7.
62. Zhang, supra note 28, at 131–34.
63. Labor Contract Law, supra note 1. Early drafts of the law received an
unprecedented level of public response and generated highly contentious debates. Cooney et al., China’s New Labour Contract Law: Responding to the
Growing Complexity of Labour Relations in the PRC, 30 U.N.S.W.L.J. 786, 789
(2007). These debates involved not only Chinese workers, union leaders, management, labor bureau officials, and academics, but also international business
lobbyists and labor organizations. Warner, M. and Zhu, Y., Labour-Management Relations in the People’s Republic of China: Whither the ‘Harmonious Society’? 20 (Cambridge Judge Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 11, 2008). The Labor

628

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 40:2

merous progressive provisions that discomforted many employers. Among the most controversial were the insistence on a written and signed employment contract and the hefty penalties for
non-compliance with the formalities. 64 If a contract remained
unsigned after one year, an employer would be deemed to have
entered into an open-term employment relationship with an employee.65 While the LCL allowed an employee to resign unilaterally upon proper notice,66 an employer did not have unfettered
discretion to terminate an employee. An employer was required
to make severance payments based on the employee’s years of
service67 and generally could not dismiss an employee without
cause and notice.68 Furthermore, an employer had to compensate an employee for overtime work at a rate sometimes up to
three times the normal wages.69
For many enterprises, these stringent provisions meant a dramatic increase in their labor costs and a severe reduction of their
organizational flexibility. To cope with the legal changes, enterprises exploited a loophole in Article 66 of the LCL, which pro-

Contract Law’s passage represents a compromise between the competing demands of these interest groups. Cooney et al., supra, at 786.
64. Employers who fail to formalize the employment relationship with their
employees in a written contract within one month of the employee commencing
work must pay double the agreed-upon wages until the contract requirement
is complied with. Labor Contract Law, supra note 1, art. 10. This is different
from the 1995 Labor Law, which required the formation of a contract, but did
not specify a written requirement. Compare Labor Contract Law, supra note
1, art. 10 with Labor Law, supra note 54, art. 16.
65. An open-term employment contract refers to a contract where the employer and the employee did not agree on a definite time to end the employment
relationship. In other words, the employee will be employed on an ongoing,
potentially permanent, basis, and the employer may not dismiss the employee
without cause and notice. Labor Contract Law, supra note 1, art. 14.
66. Id. art. 37–38.
67. Id. art. 47.
68. The Labor Contract Law, supra note 1, prescribed several grounds by
which an employer may dismiss an employee, including the following: (1) mutual agreement (art. 36); (2) summary dismissal, where the employee was
found to be unqualified during probation period, had violated internal rules
and regulations, or had committed fraud, dishonesty or other gross misconduct
(art. 39); (3) termination by notice on statutory causes (art. 40); and (4) mass
redundancy due to reorganization or difficulties in operations or management
(art. 41).
69. Id. art. 31.
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vided that “workers are dispatched generally for temporary, auxiliary, or substituting jobs.”70 Relying on the unqualified nature
of the word “generally,” many enterprises used dispatch workers
extensively and on a continuing basis, even though this was not
what the law intended.71 In 2012, in response to the misuse and
overuse of labor dispatch arrangements, the Chinese legislature
passed an Amendment to the Labor Contract Law,72 the provisions of which will be discussed in detail in Part II.
B. The Rise of the Labor Dispatch System
China’s experience with labor dispatch can be divided into four
periods.73 First, the opening up of the Chinese economy in 1978
and the influx of foreign enterprises necessitated the birth of labor dispatch agencies, which were called “foreign services companies” at the time.74 Foreign enterprises that set up representative offices in China could not hire employees directly because
70. Id. art. 66. (emphasis added).
71. According to the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, as of 2012, the
estimated number of dispatch workers was 60 million, which had been up more
than twofold since the promulgation of the 2008 Labor Contract Law. See Roberts, supra note 10. Not only did private enterprises and foreign invested enterprises employ dispatch workers, but SOEs and civil services were also heavy
users of dispatch workers. Ding Yongxun (丁永勋), Laowu Paiqian: Tonggong
Tongchou, Guoqi Ying Daitou (劳务派遣: 同工同酬国企应带头) [Labor Dispatch:
State-Owned Enterprises Should Lead the Implementation of the “Equal Pay
for Equal Work” Principle], GUANGMING RIBAO (光明日报) (China), July 1, 2013,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/comments/2013-07/01/c_116348843.htm.
Industries that had a significant proportion of dispatch workers included public
transportation, aviation, railroad, banking, insurance, telecommunications,
customs, and even the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security,
which is a government organ charged with national labor policies and regulations. In some cases, enterprises, including state-owned ones, hired so many
dispatch workers that they comprised more than half of the total workforce.
Shenzhen Xinchou Luanxiang: Yongren Danwei Ge Xian Shentong Guibi
Tonggong Tongchou (深圳薪酬乱象: 用人单位各显神通规避同工同酬) [Chaos of
Shenzhen’s Worker Remuneration: User Enterprises Use All Kinds of Ways to
Evade Conforming to the “Equal Pay for Equal Work” Principle], SHENZHEN
SHANGBAO (China), Aug. 22, 2013, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2013-0822/061028014650.shtml. Ho and Huang called employers’ replacement of direct hires with dispatch workers “creative compliance.” Ho & Huang, supra
note 7, at 981.
72. The Amendment, supra note 3.
73. Labor Dispatch System in Reform, WINDOW ON THE SOUTH (China), Mar.
17, 2011, translated by China Labor News Translations.
74. Xu, supra note 4, at 444.
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the foreign representative offices were not considered “legal persons” in China.75 Therefore, these representative offices had to
engage labor dispatch agencies in order to hire local employees.76
Second, labor dispatch agencies gained prominence as the
state endorsed them throughout the economic reform period.77
The state, dissatisfied with the rigidity of the job allocation system during the old “iron rice bowl” era, attempted to rid itself of
the “social responsibilities” of guaranteeing lifelong employment
and social welfare.78 It laid off workers wholesale and advocated
an “active employment” policy, which encouraged workers to
rely on themselves to seek jobs, with the market mediating employment and the role of the State only to promote employment.79 The labor contract system that was introduced at the
time also reduced workers’ reliance on the state.80 However, worried that an abrupt turn to an open labor market would disrupt
the public order and undermine the basis of Party-state legitimacy, the state set up re-employment service centers to help the
laid-off workers find alternative employment.81 It also engaged
the help of labor dispatch agencies to sever the legal employment
relationship with existing workers.82 To do so, the state made
some workers resign and then reobtained the service of the same
workers through labor dispatch agencies that directly hired
them.83 Labor dispatch agencies also helped other unemployed
workers find jobs.84 Therefore, the state regarded labor dispatch

75. Id. The following are the four modes of business presence for foreign
enterprises entering China: wholly foreign owned enterprise, representative
office, foreign vested partnership enterprise, and joint venture. A representative office serves as a liaison and promotion office for its parent company and
is not allowed to directly engage in operational activities. It cannot sign contracts or issue invoices on behalf of the parent company; neither can it buy or
own property. Representative Office Registration in China, PATH TO CHINA
(Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.pathtochina.com/reg_ro.htm.
76. Xu, supra note 4, at 444.
77. Labor Dispatch System in Reform, supra note 73.
78. Xu, supra note 4, at 438.
79. Id. at 434.
80. Friedman & Lee, supra note 26, at 509.
81. The state called the laid-off workers “off-post” (xiagan) as opposed to
“unemployed” to avoid any negative connotation. “Off-post” means that these
workers were merely waiting for jobs. Xu, supra note 4, at 438–43.
82. Labor Dispatch System in Reform, supra note 73.
83. Xu, supra note 4, at 438–43.
84. Id.
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agencies as an important institutional support in the labor market, enabling the state to phase out the “iron rice bowl” employment system and tackle the unemployment problem that existed
at the time.85
Third, the labor dispatch industry underwent unprecedented
expansion as China became increasingly integrated into the
global economy including its entry into the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) in 2001.86 China’s abundant supply of relatively
cheap labor and low labor standards lured foreign enterprises to
set up production facilities in China or outsource their manufacturing operations to Chinese suppliers. 87 These foreign enterprises, along with domestic private enterprises, actively used labor dispatch in their operations.88 Labor dispatch arrangements
provided these enterprises with the kind of flexibility needed to
meet fluctuating production needs caused by rapid shifts in demand, the implementation of new technologies, and recurrent
economic cycles.89 The supply of dispatch workers allowed enterprises to hire needed workers during times of economic expansion, while at times of cutbacks, enterprises could downsize their
workforces without incurring massive layoff and unemployment
costs.90 In 2005, 85 percent of wholly foreign-owned enterprises
used dispatch workers.91 The number of dispatch workers continued to rise, and labor dispatch agencies in China were established one after another as the labor dispatch service came to be
seen as a highly lucrative and inexpensive business.92
Fourth, the implementation of the Labor Contract Law in 2008
marked the beginning of another period of expansion of the labor

85. Id. at 442.
86. Labor Dispatch System in Reform, supra note 73. China and the WTO,
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2014).
87. RONALD C. BROWN, UNDERSTANDING LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW IN
CHINA 4 (2010).
88. Labor Dispatch System in Reform, supra note 73.
89. Orly Lobel, The Slipperiness of Stability: Contracting for Flexible and
Triangular Employment Relationships in the New Economy, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN
L. REV. 109, 115 (2003).
90. Steven J. Arsenault et al., An Employee by Any Other Name Does Not
Smell as Sweet: A Continuing Drama, 16 LAB. L.J. 285, 285–86 (2000).
91. Labor Dispatch System in Reform, supra note 73.
92. Id.

632

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 40:2

dispatch industry.93 The LCL touched the nerves of many businesses, as it made termination of workers prohibitively expensive and adjustment of the size of the workforce extremely difficult. 94 Some found that the law excessively empowered workers95 and denounced it as instigating a return to the socialist
“iron rice bowl” era.96 As a result, employers increasingly turned
to the use of dispatch workers.97 The practice of using dispatch
workers helped employers save significant costs in terms of social security payments, workers’ compensation, and severance
pay as the workers were considered the employees of the labor
dispatch agencies and not the host companies.98 In anticipation
of the LCL taking effect in 2008, many employers unilaterally
terminated workers and demanded that the same workers sign
contracts with labor dispatch agencies to resume their positions,
known as “reverse labor dispatch.”99 The labor dispatch industry
as a whole experienced an “abnormal” boom.100
II. COMPARISON OF THE LABOR DISPATCH PROVISIONS IN THE
2008 LABOR CONTRACT LAW AND THE 2013 AMENDMENT
The Chinese legislature took the first step to accord dispatch
workers legal protection in the 2008 Labor Contract Law.101 Rather than benefitting from the new law, dispatch workers became a target of exploitation as companies substituted their direct hires with dispatch workers.102 This Part compares the labor dispatch provisions in the 2008 Labor Contract Law with
the 2013 Amendment and exposes the loopholes that remain unclosed.

93. Id.
94. See Labor Contract Law, supra note 1, art. 36, 39–41.
95. Yin Lily Zheng, It’s Not What is on Paper, But What is in Practice:
China’s New Labor Contract Law and the Enforcement Problem, 8 WASH. U.
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 595, 596 (2009).
96. Geoff Dyer, China’s Labor Law Raises US Concerns, FINANCIAL TIMES
(May
2,
2007),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/09d35e16-f8c4-11db-a940000b5df10621.html#axzz2kGkj3O14.
97. Roberts, supra note 10.
98. Standaert, supra note 7.
99. Rights of 60 Million Labor Dispatch Workers Hard to Protect, JINAN
DAILY (China), Feb. 28, 2011, translated by China Labor News Translations.
100. Id.
101. Ho & Huang, supra note 7, at 980–81.
102. Id.

2015]

CHINESE LABOR DISPATCH WORKERS

633

A. Labor Dispatch Provisions under the 2008 Labor Contract
Law
The 2008 Labor Contract Law contained specific provisions
that governed the labor dispatch industry and the use of labor
dispatch arrangements.103 Article 57 stipulated that labor dispatch agencies must have registered capital in the amount of at
least 500,000 Renminbi (“¥”).104 Article 58 identified labor dispatch agencies as the legal employers of dispatch workers and
required them to fulfill the obligations of an employer.105 Article
63 embodied the “equal pay for equal work” principle by stating
that dispatch workers “shall have the right to receive the same
pay as that received by employees of [the host company] for the
same work.”106 In the event that a host company did not have an
employee in the same position, the remuneration would be determined with reference to that paid to an employee in the same
or a similar position in the same geographical area.107 Article 66
provided that “workers are dispatched generally for temporary,
auxiliary, or substituting jobs.”108 This provision was aimed at
encouraging enterprises to directly hire workers and accord
them the strengthened legal protection of the LCL, concerning
pay, overtime work, termination, and union association
rights.109 “Temporary,” “auxiliary,” and “substituting” were not
defined. Article 92 required labor dispatch agencies that violated
the LCL to take corrective actions, and if the violations were severe, the agencies would be fined between RMB 1000 and RMB
5000 for every dispatch worker involved and have their business
licenses revoked.110 In addition, it provided that a labor dispatch
agency would bear joint and several liability with the accepting

103. Labor Contract Law, supra note 1, art. 57–67, 92.
104. Id. art. 57. ¥500,000 is approximately equivalent to USD 81,635. Currency Converter, BLOOMBERG, http://www.bloomberg.com/markets/currencies/currency-converter/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2014).
105. Labor Contract Law, supra note 1, art. 58.
106. Id. art. 63.
107. Id.
108. Id. art. 66 (emphasis added).
109. Kevin L. Jones, China’s Remedy for Labor Inequity Could Spark Unrest,
LAW 360 (Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.faegrebd.com/webfiles/China’s%20Remedy%20For%20Labor%20Inequity%20Could%20Spark%20Unrest.pdf.
110. Labor Contract Law, supra note 1, art. 93.
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entity for compensation if any damage were caused to the dispatch worker, without regard as to who caused it.111
B. The 2013 Amendment
The 2013 Amendment to the LCL specifically targeted the use
of labor dispatch and the regulation of the labor dispatch industry. Mainly, it raised the entry capitalization threshold for labor
dispatch agencies, restated the “equal pay for equal work” principle, restricted the situations in which dispatch workers could
be used, and imposed higher penalties for both labor dispatch
agencies and host companies for noncompliance of the law.112
The first provision of the Amendment increased the minimum
registered capital required to operate a labor dispatch agency
under Article 57 from ¥500,000 to ¥2,000,000. 113 The second
provision reemphasized the “equal pay for equal work” principle
and mandated that employers apply the same “labor remuneration distribution methods” to dispatch workers and their direct
hires. 114 The third provision provided that direct employment
must be “the basic form of employment” and that employment
through labor dispatch arrangement would be “a supplementary
form” and only used in “temporary,” “auxiliary,” and “back-up”
positions.115 This provision defined a “temporary” position as a
position that would last no more than six months; an “auxiliary”
position as a position of non-core business operations that served
the core business positions of the employer; and a “back-up” position as a temporarily vacant position that could be performed
by others because a permanent employee was unable to complete
his job responsibilities due to vacation leave, short-term study,
or other legitimate reasons.116 In addition, the same provision
required that the labor administrative department of the State
Council prescribe a maximum percentage of dispatch workers

111. Id.
112. Su Yingsheng (苏应生) & Chen Chunmei (陈春梅), Qianxi Laodong
Hetong Fa Xiuzhengan dui Laowu Paiqian de Yingxiang (浅析《劳动合同法(修
正案)》 对劳务派遣的影响) [Brief Analysis of the Impact of the Labor Contract
Law Amendment on Labor Dispatch], 2 ZHONGGUO LAODONG 17, 17–19 (2013)
(China).
113. The Amendment, supra note 3, provision 1.
114. Id. provision 2.
115. Id. provision 3 (emphasis added).
116. Id.
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that an employer could use out of its total workforce. 117 The
fourth provision required a labor dispatch agency operating
without a valid license to turn over any illegal gain and pay a
fine of up to five times its illegal gain.118 It also ordered labor
dispatch agencies and host companies that violated the law to
take corrective actions promptly.119 If the dispatch agency or the
host company took no corrective action within the prescribed
deadline, it would be fined between ¥5000 and ¥10,000 for every
dispatch worker concerned, and specifically, the dispatch agency
would have its business license revoked.120 The same provision
required the dispatch agency to assume joint and several liability with the host company to compensate for any damage “caused
by the [host company] to the dispatch worker involved.”121 The
Amendment did not revise Article 58 of the LCL, which identified dispatch agencies as the legal employers of dispatch workers.
C. Analysis of the Current Law
Despite its intention to offer more protection to dispatch workers, the Amendment cannot achieve that purpose because, like
the LCL, it does not clearly inform a dispatch worker of which
party to pursue when his rights are violated. Instead, the
Amendment adds a phrase “caused by the host company” to Article 92, which requires labor dispatch agencies to assume joint
and several liability with host companies only for damages suffered by a dispatch worker caused by the host company.122 This
addition means that a court is required to distinguish damages
117. Id. On Aug. 7, 2013, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security released draft measures for the implementation of the Amendment regarding labor dispatch for public consultation. Article 5 set the percentage of dispatch worker ratio at 10 percent. Guanyu Laowu Paiqian Ruogan Guiding
Zhengqiu Yijian Gao Gongkai Zhengqiu Yijian de Tongzhi (关于<<劳务派遣若
干规定(征求意见稿)>> 公开征求意见的通知) [Notice to Solicit Opinions on the
Draft Measures for the Implementation of the Amendment Regarding Labor
Dispatch] (issued by the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of
China,
Aug.
7,
2013)
(China),
http://www.mohrss.gov.cn/SYrlzyhshbzb/zxhd/SYzhengqiuyijian/201308/t20130807_109508.htm.
118. The Amendment, supra note 3, provision 1.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. The Amendment, supra note 3, provision 4.
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caused to a dispatch worker by a host company from those
caused by a labor dispatch agency. If it is the former, the worker
will be able to enforce a judgment against both the agency and
the company; if it is the latter, the worker will only be able to
obtain relief from the agency. This distinction matters because
the dispatch worker has a better chance of actually recovering
damages when both parties are held liable. Nevertheless, in reality, it may not be clear-cut as to who caused the damage to the
dispatch worker, as demonstrated by the following cases.
In 2006, in Hanzhou, a dispatch worker who worked as a security guard in a factory died on the job.123 It was not clear what
exactly caused his death, but the incident took place at the factory.124 The deceased’s parents sued the labor dispatch agency,
and the court held the agency liable.125 However, since the death
occurred at the factory, one may reasonably connect the death to
the host company through, perhaps, its failure to provide safety
protection for, lack of training for, or overworking of the guard.
Yet the court found that, since it was a workplace casualty, the
agency, which was the guard’s legal and contractual employer,
was liable. 126 Under the Amendment, which party caused the
damage to the worker is pertinent to the deceased’s family’s ability to recover damages. If the court had found that the factory
caused the guard’s death, the family would have been able to
enforce the judgment against both the factory owner and the labor dispatch agency, instead of only the agency.
In another 2006 case in Beijing, a dispatch worker, who
worked as a promoter at a phone company, was owed overtime
pay and demanded compensation from the phone company.
However, he was denied the payment on the basis that the company did not have an employment relationship with him.127 The
worker then proceeded against his agency, but was again turned

123. Laowu Paiqian Yuangong Shangban Cusi: Shei lai Chengdan Zeren? (劳
务派遣员工上班猝死: 谁来承担责任) [Who Bears the Responsibility of a Dispatch
Worker’s Death During the Course of Employment?], HUALUWANG (华律网)
(China), Apr 11, 2012, http://www.66law.cn/goodcase/12001.aspx.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Laowu Paiqian Renyuan de Jiaban Gongzi Shei lai Zhifu (劳务派遣人员
的加班工资谁来支付) [Who is Responsible for the Overtime Payment of a Dispatch Worker?], HUALUWANG ( 华 律 网 ) (China), Oct 12, 2011,
http://www.66law.cn/goodcase/10198.aspx.
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away because the agency maintained that it had never arranged
for him to work overtime.128 Eventually, the worker arbitrated
the claim against both parties.129 The arbitrator found the phone
company liable, but also assigned joint and several liability to
the agency.130 This case demonstrates that both host companies
and labor dispatch agencies have a tendency to shirk responsibility and impute liability to the other party when a dispute
arises. Moreover, dispatch workers often do not know who their
“employers” are because they perform work-related tasks for one
and have a contractual relationship with the other.
This problem is further compounded by the fact that the
heightened entry capitalization requirement from ¥500,000 to
¥2,000,000 does not necessarily make labor dispatch agencies be
in a better position to compensate an injured dispatch worker,
as past experience shows. When the LCL was passed in 2007, it
raised the minimum registered capital for labor dispatch agencies from ¥30,000 to ¥500,000.131 Nevertheless, this increase did
not result in dispatch workers receiving the pay and benefits to
which they were legally entitled.132 On the contrary, by explicitly
regulating labor dispatch, the law legitimized labor dispatch as
a form of employment.133 Many enterprises began to exploit this
form of employment because the law merely advised that labor
dispatch be used in certain limited situations, but did not completely foreclose their ability to use labor dispatch outside those

128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. This case was a bit unusual in that Article 62 of the Labor Contract
Law, which was unrevised, expressly required a host company to pay overtime
remunerations to dispatch workers. The fact that the worker arbitrated the
claim against both the host company and his agency illustrates the point that
dispatch workers can be confused about which party is liable for the damages
they suffer.
131. Rights of 60 Million Labor Dispatch Workers Hard to Protect, supra note
99.
132. Id.
133. Chaos of Shenzhen’s Worker Remuneration: User Enterprises Use All
Kinds of Ways to Evade Conforming to the “Equal Pay for Equal Work” Principle, supra note 71.
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situations.134 The labor dispatch industry underwent an unprecedented boom.135 For instance, between 2010 and 2011, the number of agencies grew dramatically from 49,000 to 56,000.136 One
method labor dispatch agencies used to get around the law was
to get the required registered capital through borrowing.137 As
soon as they obtained the business licenses to begin operations,
the labor dispatch agencies could return the funds because the
authority would not monitor or investigate the subsequent activities of the agencies.138 Consequently, many of the agencies
operate as “empty shells,” leaving dispatch workers with no relief if their rights are violated.139
As an additional safeguard, shortly before the Amendment became effective, on June 20, 2013, the Chinese Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security issued detailed measures for
the implementation of the administrative license for labor dispatch agencies.140 Specifically, the Ministry would supervise and
guide the work of labor dispatch agencies on an ongoing basis,141
and the dispatch agencies would have to submit annual reports
about their business operations and financial situations.142 However, the dispatch agencies are not required to lodge the capital
with a bank or financial institution. Therefore, it is possible for
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. During the same period, Japan and the United States came second and
third in the ranking, but the total number of their private employment agencies had stayed virtually constant, at 20,000 and 13,910, respectively. Compare
CIETT: INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES,
THE AGENCY WORK INDUSTRY AROUND THE WORLD 18 (2013), available at
http://www.ciett.org/uploads/media/Ciett_EC_Report_2013_Final_web.pdf
with CIETT: INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT
AGENCIES, THE AGENCY WORK INDUSTRY AROUND THE WORLD 12 (2012), available at http://www.ciett.org/fileadmin/templates/ciett/docs/Stats/Ciett_econ_report_2012_final.pdf.
137. Rights of 60 Million Labor Dispatch Workers Hard to Protect, supra note
99.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Laowu Paiqian Xingzheng Xuke Shishi Banfa (劳务派遣行政许可实施办
法) [Measures for the Implementation of Administrative License for Labor Dispatch] (issued by the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of
China, Jun. 20, 2013) (China), http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2013-06/21/content_2430867.htm [hereinafter the Measures].
141. Id. art. 3.
142. Id. art. 22.

2015]

CHINESE LABOR DISPATCH WORKERS

639

labor dispatch agencies to shuffle their funds and manipulate
the information they submit in their annual reports, making it
difficult for the Ministry to appraise their financial health. 143
The heightened entry requirement, therefore, will not guarantee
relief for injured dispatch workers.
To ensure that a wronged dispatch worker can assert his rights
and recover damages from a financially able party, it is necessary to re-conceptualize the notion of an “employer” in Chinese
law. The labor contract system espoused by China relied heavily
on the idea of bilateral contracts between workers and employers.144 The LCL expressly identified labor dispatch agencies as
the workers’ only employer. 145 However, the conception of the
employer as a single indivisible entity failed to capture the reality that dispatch workers are subject to various sources of direction and supervision.146 Although the law imposed joint and several liability on both host companies and dispatch agencies in
certain situations,147 it did not consider a host company an “employer.” Therefore, the current law has allowed enterprises to
exercise functions of an employer, but avoid the formal status of
an employer, thereby evading employer-related responsibilities.148
III. THE DOCTRINE OF JOINT EMPLOYMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES
The doctrine of joint employment, used in the United States,
encapsulates the mechanics of distributing liability in a trilateral or multilateral employment arrangement. It is a mechanism
by which responsibility can be ascribed to parties other than the

143. Chaos of Shenzhen’s Worker Remuneration: User Enterprises Use All
Kinds of Ways to Evade Conforming to the “Equal Pay for Equal Work” Principle, supra note 71.
144. China borrowed the labor contract system from the West when it opened
up its economy in the late 1970s. The traditional, Western employment relationship is founded on a bilateral contract between an employee and an employer. Thai, supra note 11, at *13–14; see also Zhang, supra note 28, at 148.
145. Labor Contract Law, supra note 1, art. 58.
146. Thai, supra note 11, at *13–14.
147. Labor Contract Law, supra note 1, art. 92.
148. Lobel, supra note 89, at 115–16.
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contractual employer when more than one entity exercises employer functions over a worker.149 Under this doctrine, an individual may be the employee of more than one employer in the
same job, and an employer may be held liable for labor violations
committed exclusively by another joint employer. 150 The advantage of this doctrine is that a worker can recover damages in
the entirety from any one or all of the wrongdoers, so long as he
does not receive double compensation.151
Various U.S. statutes incorporate the joint employer doctrine,
and the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) defines “employ”
broadly as “to suffer or permit to work.”152 The tests for determining whether a joint employment relationship exists differ
across federal circuits, but most courts focus on whether the alleged joint employer has asserted “control” over the workers.153
Courts analyze the “economic realities” of the situation to determine the existence of a joint employment relationship.154 This
Note examines the tests used by the Ninth and Second Circuits,
which illustrate formal control and functional control respectively.
A. The Bonnette Test of the Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit developed a four-part test in Bonnette v.
California Health & Welfare Agency, where it found that the California state and county welfare agencies were joint employers

149. Thai, supra note 11, at *24.
150. ABA SECTION ON LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES COMMITTEE, Joint Employer Liability under the FLSA: Wage
and Hour Claims by Employees of Subcontractors and Litigation Issues Involving Undocumented Workers (2012), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_law/2012/03/employment_rights_responsibilities_committee_midwinter_meeting/25.authcheckdam.pdf.
151. Robert S. Peck, The Development of the Law of Joint and Several Liability, 15 HAW. B.J. 4, 4–5 (2011).
152. Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2006).
153. PROSKAUER ROSE LLP, Client Alert: Second Circuit Expands Potential
Vicarious Joint Employer Liability for Wage and Hour Violations by Subcontractors (2004), http://www.proskauer.com/files/News/8aa36ed7-0eee-4367b39f-51857271ec02/Presentation/NewsAttachment/2b216849-3313-424c9543-10660a6b4853/4cde4963-fd99-4357-b9f7-a0abc6fc77c8.pdf.
154. ABA SECTION ON LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 150, at 2.
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of chore workers who provided domestic in-home services to welfare recipients. 155 In order to avoid being considered the employer of the chore workers, the agencies provided the recipients
with funds and asked them to select, hire, and pay the workers. 156 However, the agencies determined the tasks to be performed, hours required, and rate of pay and verified the hours
worked before disbursing any payment.157 The agencies also regularly supervised the chore workers’ job performance. 158 The
workers, who did not receive minimum wage, brought a claim to
hold the state agencies jointly liable,159 since their contractual
employers, the welfare recipients, would not be able to pay any
judgment. In determining whether the agencies were joint employers, the Ninth Circuit looked at whether the alleged employers (1) had the power to hire and fire the employees, (2) supervised and controlled employee work schedules or conditions of
employment, (3) determined the rate and method of payment,
and (4) maintained employment records.160 Although the court
did not make a determination as to whether the agencies had
the power to hire and fire the chore workers, the court found that
their overall influence and control made them joint employers of
the chore workers.161
The Bonnette court expressly mentioned that the four factors
were not intended to be “etched in stone” 162 and, indeed, the
court’s application in Zhao v. Bebe Stores, Inc.163 revealed the
limitation of the four-factor test. In Zhao, although Bebe actively
reviewed the work product of the subcontractor’s employees for
quality control purposes and retained a company to monitor the
subcontractor’s compliance with applicable labor laws, Bebe was
not a joint employer with the subcontractor. 164 The court reasoned that the subcontractor had the full power to hire and fire
the workers, control the workers’ schedules, and determine the

155. Bonnette v. California Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470
(9th Cir. 1983).
156. Id. at 1468.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1470.
159. Id. at 1468.
160. Id. at 1470.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Zhao v. Bebe Stores, Inc., 247 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1157 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
164. Id. at 1160.
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rate and method of pay, and it maintained employment records.165 The Bonnette factors, therefore, mainly focused on formal control and did not account for functional control.
B. The Zheng Test of the Second Circuit
Acknowledging the limitations of the Bonnette factors, the Second Circuit in Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., Inc. stated that the
four factors were sufficient, but not necessary, to establish joint
employment. 166 In Zheng, a garment manufacturer contracted
out the last phase of its production process to a contractor,
which, in turn, hired the plaintiff garment workers and did not
comply with the national minimum wage requirements.167 The
workers alleged that their work was done predominantly for the
manufacturer and that the manufacturer sent representatives
to the contractor’s factory regularly to inspect their work and
give instructions and orders.168 The appellate court found that
the trial court erred by relying exclusively on an analysis of the
four Bonnette factors.169 It remanded the case and ordered the
trial court to consider the following six factors, in addition to the
Bonnette factors: (1) whether the premises and equipment of the
alleged joint employer were used for a worker’s task; (2) whether
the subcontractor had a business that could or did shift as a unit
from one putative joint employer to another; (3) the extent to
which the worker performed a discrete line-job that was integral
to the alleged joint employer’s process of production; (4) whether
responsibility under the contracts could pass from one subcontractor to another without material changes; (5) the degree to
which the alleged joint employer supervised the worker’ work;

165. Id.
166. Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., Inc., 355 F.3d 61, 79 (2d Cir. 2003). In
Zheng, the Second Circuit referred to the Bonnette factors as the “Carter factors” because it previously adopted them in Carter v. Dutchess Community College, 735 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1984). For the purposes of consistency, this Note will
refer to the four-factor test as the Bonnette test.
167. Zheng, 355 F.3d at 64–65.
168. Id. at 65.
169. Id. at 78–79.
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and (6) whether the workers worked exclusively or predominantly for the alleged joint employer.170 By examining these factors, the Second Circuit acknowledged that an entity that had
“functional control” over a worker, even in the absence of the formal control measured by the Bonnette factors, could be found to
be a joint employer.171
IV. INCORPORATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE JOINT EMPLOYER
INTO CHINESE LAW
By incorporating the doctrine of joint employer into its law,
China can ensure that dispatch workers are able to assert their
rights against all entities that act as an “employer” and enforce
a judgment against the more financially equipped party. Moreover, such a “transplantation” of a common law doctrine into a
civil law system is workable.172 To do so, Article 58 of the Labor
Contract Law should re-conceptualize the notion of an employer
as any entity that exerts “formal or functional” control over dispatch workers, and not limit that notion to entities that have a
contractual relationship with the workers. The terms “formal
control” and “functional control” should be loosely defined, and
the Bonnette factors and the Zheng factors should be included as
a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered by judges. These
factors will be useful guideposts for judges to assess whether an

170. Id. at 72. The six factors were drawn from Rutherford Food Corp. v.
McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947) (finding that a slaughterhouse was a joint employer of meat boners, even though it did not hire the meat boners, set their
hours, and pay them, and that meat boners were hired by their supervisors
with whom the slaughterhouse contracted).
171. Zheng, 355 F.3d at 72.
172. China is a civil law country, and the United States is a common law
country. The two have different political and economic systems. When “transplanting” laws from one legal system to another, Alan Watson, a legal commentator, argued that law is separate from social systems and that “borrowing” from a very different legal system, such as one at a different stage of development or with a different political structure, could be successful. In his
opinion, the legal reformer is looking for an idea that could be incorporated
into part of the law of his country, and the success of such a legal transplant
depends on the recipient country’s desire for, or receptiveness to, the foreign
legal rule, rather than similarities with its context. Anthony Forsyth, The
‘Transplantability’ Debate in Comparative Law and Comparative Labor Law:
Implications for Australian Borrowing from European Labor Law 2–3 (Ctr. for
Emp’t & Labor Relations L., Working Paper No. 38, 2006), available at
http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/files/dmfile/wp381.pdf.
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entity has exercised meaningful control over a worker so as to be
deemed a joint employer.
Moreover, in the revised Article 92 of the LCL, the distinction
between damage caused to a dispatch worker by a host company
and that caused by a labor dispatch agency should be eliminated.
Entities that are found to be joint employers of the dispatch
worker should be jointly and severally liable for all employmentrelated damages.
To illustrate how the incorporation of the joint employer doctrine will help dispatch workers assert their rights against, and
recover damages from, entities other than the labor dispatch
agencies, their contractual employers, this Note will apply the
Bonnette and Zheng factors to the case of Apple, Inc. (“Apple”).
Apple, a prominent multinational company that designs, develops, and sells consumer electronics and computer software, has
contracted with a number of suppliers in China to manufacture
its products.173 These suppliers, in turn, hire a large number of
dispatch workers to work at their factories.174 In this scenario,
four parties are involved in this employment relationship—Apple, the Chinese suppliers, the labor dispatch agencies, and dispatch workers. Neither the suppliers nor Apple have a contractual relationship with the dispatch workers. These dispatch
workers, in reality, are treated like “second-class workers” in the
factories.175 They generally receive lower wages and fewer benefits, while working longer hours.176 Many suffer from work-related injuries, and some have even committed suicide.177 Under
the current law, these injured workers may bring a lawsuit
against the agencies and potentially the factories, if the injuries
were caused by the factories. Nevertheless, Apple, the most
wealthy and responsible party, can walk away without any accountability. If the court finds that the agency is responsible for
a worker’s injury, the worker will only be able to recover from
the agency, which is unlikely to have sufficient resources to pay
damages. If the court finds that the factory is responsible, the
worker will be able to cover from both the agency and the factory.
173. See CHINA LABOR WATCH, BEYOND FOXCONN: DEPLORABLE WORKING
CONDITIONS CHARACTERIZE APPLE’S ENTIRE SUPPLY CHAIN (June 27, 2012),
http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/pdf/2012627-5.pdf.
174. Id. at 10–18.
175. Id. at 11.
176. Id. at 6–8.
177. Id. at 3.
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Yet, the factory may not necessarily be in a better position to
compensate the workers because it may have cash flow problems.
If the court applies the Bonnette and Zheng factors of the joint
employer doctrine, it will be irrelevant which party caused the
damage to the worker. As long as the injury is employment-related, the court will look at both formal and functional control
exerted by the factory and Apple. Since Apple is the one that
prescribed the product requirements and both Apple and the factory exercise some degree of control over the dispatch worker in
terms of quality control, they may be held as joint employers. In
this case, the worker will be able to recover from the agency, the
factory, and Apple. Access to Apple’s deep pockets is important
because, more likely than not, Apple will be the only party that
can afford to compensate the workers.
The Zheng test, which focuses on functional control of an alleged joint employer when formal control is absent, is particularly useful in the finding of a joint employer liability when an
enterprise uses a subcontracting arrangement as a subterfuge to
evade employer obligations.178 Many multinational enterprises
engage Chinese subcontractors to perform some aspects of their
work and exert general quality control, but avoid direct involvement in the employment practices of the subcontractor in order
to avoid liabilities.179 Application of the Zheng test will help to
bring these enterprises into the purview of the law and allow
178. Client Alert: Second Circuit Expands Potential Vicarious Joint Employer
Liability for Wage and Hour Violations by Subcontractors, supra note 153.
179. Jabil Circuit, an electronics manufacturer that produced the rear plastic
cover for Apple’s iPhone 5C, infringed its workers’ rights in numerous ways,
including the following: excessively long work hours, refusal to provide work
breaks, use of dispatch workers beyond statutory limits, lack of safety training,
and forcing workers to sign disclaimers releasing it from any liability. See
CHINA LABOR WATCH, CHINESE WORKERS EXPLOITED BY U.S.-OWNED IPHONE
SUPPLIER: AN INVESTIGATION OF LABOR CONDITIONS AT JABIL GREEN POINT IN
WUXI,
CHINA
(Sept.
5,
2013),
http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/pdf/Jabil_Green_Point.final.pdf. Samkwang, a supplier with factories in several locations in Asia, including China, manufactures cell phones
and electronic parts and components for Samsung, is involved in many labor
violations. Its factory in China made its workers work excessively long hours,
did not pay for overtime, hired dispatch workers in excess of the statutory
limit, provided inadequate training, and failed to maintain a safe and satisfactory working environment. See CHINA LABOR WATCH, INVESTIGATIVE REPORT OF
SAMKWANG SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. (Dec. 5, 2013), http://chinalaborwatch.org/pdf/2013.12.11_Dongguan_Samkwang_Science_and_Tech.pdf.
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dispatch workers to access an additional, and often more financially able, entity for recovering damages.
CONCLUSION
China’s extraordinary economic success since its initiation of
economic reforms and trade liberalization has stunned the
world. However, its legal system has not had the luxury of time
to undergo a lengthy elaboration process, but has had to compress this process into a very short period. 180 Borrowing and
adopting foreign laws is inevitable, and China will benefit from
incorporating the doctrine of joint employer from the United
States; so that economic development will not be carried out at
the expense of workers who lack bargaining power. In fact, globalization has increased the need for ever greater organizational
flexibility and increased competitive pressure, the misuse and
overuse of agency workers have become commonplace in many
countries, some of which have considered or experimented with
the idea of dual or joint employers.181 The joint employer doctrine sanctions enterprises that externalize liabilities onto third
parties while benefiting from the fruit of dispatch workers’ hard
work. It is a broader and fuller conceptualization of the employment relationship found in a labor dispatch arrangement.
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180. Cooney, supra note 56, at 1058.
181. In France, a 1979 Act required agencies to lodge funds in a bank or a
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